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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 16/05/2006

Accident number: 147

Accident time: not recorded

Accident Date: 29/09/1997

Where it occurred: Kushk district, Herat
Province

Country: Afghanistan

Primary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Secondary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Class: Excavation accident

Date of main report: [No date recorded]

ID original source: none

Name of source: MAPA/UNOCHA

Organisation: Name removed
Mine/device: PMN AP blast

Ground condition: agricultural
(abandoned)
ditch/channel/trench
soft

Date record created: 13/02/2004

Date last modified: 13/02/2004

No of victims: 1

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system:

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale: not recorded

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
inadequate investigation (?)
inadequate metal-detector (?)
partner's failure to "control" (?)
pressure to work quickly (?)
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?)
visor not worn or worn raised (?)
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Accident report
At the time of the accident the UN MAC in Afghanistan favoured the use of two-man teams
(usually operating a one-man drill). The two would take it in turns for one to work on
vegetation cutting, detecting and excavation, while the other both rested and supposedly
"controlled" his partner.
An investigation on behalf of the UN MAC was carried out and its report made briefly
available. The following summarises its content.
The victim had been a deminer for six years. The victim had attended a revision course four
months before and last been on leave 42 days before the accident. The ground where he was
working was described as "agricultural land alongside a ditch: soft ground". The demining
group claim to have found fragments of the mine from which they identified it as a PMN.
The investigators determined that the accident occurred when the deminer used only one
marking stone to mark a detector signal, then prodded in a squatting position which "failed
him to maintain the correct prodding angle". It is suggested that he was careless because he
thought he had detected a fragment (having detected many fragments immediately
beforehand).
The Sub-Commander said that the victim was injured because he was not working properly.
The Section Leader said the deminer ignored his partner's correction and prodded without
wearing his helmet, believing the signal was from a fragment.
The victim stated that he did not put his helmet on because "it was very streaky and shaking
of bush." [He may have meant that the visor was hard to see through.] He blamed his
supervisor who had pushed him to work quickly and instructed him to adjust the sensitivity of
his detector to zero, so leading him to get a confusing signal.
The victim's partner said he made the mistake of believing the signal was from a fragment.

Conclusion
The investigators concluded that the victim did not follow the marking procedure properly, did
not wear his helmet and visor while prodding. They also said that the ground was suitable for
prodding in a prone position, but the victim was squatting.

Recommendations
The investigators recommended that marking procedure must be followed properly and all
readings must be treated as a mine. They also said that the team command group must
stress the need to wear helmets when prodding and that disciplinary action should be taken
against the Section Leader for poor command and control.

Victim Report
Victim number: 188

Name: Name removed
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: no

Compensation: 500,000 Rs (100%)

Time to hospital: not recorded

Protection issued: Helmet

Protection used: none

Thin, short visor
Summary of injuries:
minor Arm
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minor Chest
minor Hand
minor Shoulder
severe Eyes
severe Face
AMPUTATION/LOSS
Eye
COMMENT
See medical report.

Medical report
The victim's injuries were summarised as loss of both eyes, serious facial injuries and injuries
to his right shoulder and left hand.
The demining group reported that the victim had lost both eyes, suffered severe facial injury
and injured his left arm.
A disability claim was forwarded to his insurers on December 9th saying that the victim had
been left permanently disabled. His left eye had been "destroyed". His right eye was severely
damaged and needed further surgery: its vision was "low". He also had severe facial injuries,
chest, left arm and right hand multiple superficial wounds and a deep injury to his forehead. A
photograph showed bandaged eyes and a chest wound.
A compensation cheque for 500,000 Rs was issued on 31st December 1997 and paid on 5th
March 1998.

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Field control inadequacy" because the victim
was working improperly and his errors were not corrected. If he had been told to adjust his
detector to reduce false alarms, this represents a gross field control inadequacy. If the visor
he was given to wear was impossible to see though, the management's failure to provide
useable equipment would be a serious management failing.
The use of a squatting position to "excavate" was in breach of UN requirements, but not in
breach of the demining group's unauthorised variations to those requirements. The failure of
the UN MAC to either listen to field feedback and adapt the SOP for local conditions, or
enforce their own standards may be seen as a further management failing.
The persistent delays within the UN MAC between the date of compensation cheques being
issued and them being paid may deserve investigation.
The agency that was used to make investigations for the UN MAC (based in Pakistan) at this
time was frequently constrained by lack of funds, staff and transport. At times their movement
was constrained by safety concerns. As a result, investigations were frequently delayed by
weeks, meaning that an assessment of the site at the time of the accident was impossible.
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